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Introduction
The incessant adoption of new technologies from the world technology frontier and active engagement in innovation activities characterizes economic growth in developed countries.
Worker reallocation from less productive to more productive firms is viewed as an important source of aggregate productivity growth (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Foster et al., 2001 ). To the extent that the implementation of new technologies requires the establishment of new production units, productivity growth stems from the process of creative destruction, where old jobs are continuously replaced by new ones with more advanced technologies. In the model of Aghion and Howitt (1994) an acceleration of embodied productivity growth enhances job creation by raising the expected returns from creating new jobs (the capitalization effect), but also induces job destruction and discourages job creation by reducing the duration of existing jobs (the creative destruction effect). The magnitude of these opposite effects depends on wage-setting institutions, which determine how the rents of existing and new matches are shared, and employment protection legislation, which affects the cost of labour turnover. As a consequence, various shocks can lead to very different labour market outcomes under different labour market institutions (see Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000 , for some empirical evidence).
Wage compression via centralized bargaining can promote job and labour turnover by forcing less productive firms out of the market and increasing the entry of more productive firms as in the model of Moene and Wallerstein (1997) . Therefore, centralized wage bargaining may enhance productivity growth via a more rapid adoption of new technologies.
Moreover, centralization may increase firms' innovation investments by helping to reduce the hold-up problem associated with unionism (Haucap and Wey, 2004) . On the other hand, stringent employment protection regulations, which tend to reduce labour turnover, are often implemented together with wage compression policies as pointed out by Bertola and Rogerson (1997).
Many economists believe that the interaction of shocks and different labour market institutions can account for much of the divergent patterns of labour market outcomes and productivity growth between Europe and the United States over the past few decades.
This argument relies on the claim that the economic environment has changed owing to globalization (Melitz, 2003) , lower trade barriers (Bernard et al., 2006) , and the adoption of new information technologies (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2006 ).
Due to a change in circumstances, the same institutions that have worked well earlier may fail to generate satisfactory economic development.
Recent theoretical and empirical research emphasises the role of micro-structural change in productivity growth, i.e. the importance of the entry and exit of production units and reallocation between existing production units. For instance, evidence provided by Lentz and Mortensen (2005) for Denmark and by Maliranta (2005) and Böckerman and Maliranta (forthcoming) for Finland indicates that, because of extensive micro-level restructuring, the industry productivity growth rate may exceed the productivity growth rate of an average firm or plant by a factor of two or even more. As a stimulus of productivity-enhancing restructuring, the literature has emphasised the role of product market competition (e.g. Olley and Pakes, 1996) , financial markets (e.g. Ramey and Shapiro, 2001) , and labour markets (e.g. Caballero et al., 2004) .
Since micro-level dynamics have been found to play such an important role in industry productivity growth, aggregate analyses of changes in labour shares should also be complemented with analyses with micro-level data. In this paper we argue, firstly, that it is essential to make a distinction between the Continental European countries (notably, Germany and France) and Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway), as these countries differ in several respects (see e.g. Korkman, 2006) . This point can be supported on theoretical and empirical grounds. Secondly, we contribute to the literature by decomposing changes in the aggregate labour share in Finland over the past two decades into the micro-level components. This novel feature of our analysis provides us with fresh insight into the role of labour market institutions during profound technological transformation. The period under investigation is particularly interesting. During this period Finland has changed from a closed and highly regulated economy to a modern open econ-omy frequently ranked among the top economies in the world in terms of competitiveness and the use of information technologies.
We show that the decline in the labour share in Finland is essentially due to micro-level restructuring, which is the same process that in earlier studies has been found to be the main factor of productivity acceleration in Finland. In Continental Europe the mechanism behind the decline in the labour share may have been different. Institutional differences could explain why Continental Europe did not join the technological upsurge with the Nordic countries. Continental Europe has experienced a smaller decline in the labour share since the mid-1980s, has experienced regressive productivity growth and seems to have lacked "creative destruction" during the ICT era. A more extensive and efficient use of ICT has often been argued to be an important piece of the US success story. Gordon (2004) emphasise heterogeneity among European countries in this respect by pointing out a clear difference in the level of PC adoption and ICT expenditures between the US and the "olive-belt" region (Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece), whereas the Nordic countries are comparable to the US. The paper's structure is as follows. In the next section we show that there are important institutional differences between Finland (and other Nordic countries) and Continental Europe (especially France and Germany). In Section 3 we report some stylized empirical facts for the OECD countries and give a brief description of macro-economic trends for Finland. In Section 4, we discuss methodological issues, which are relevant from the viewpoint of the micro-level dynamics of productivity growth and labour income share, and outline our decomposition method. Section 5 describes our data. Empirical analysis of the micro-level sources of changes in the aggregate labour share is presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Institutional conditions for micro-structural change
We argue that the Finnish labour market institutions tend to promote resource allocation between industries and, more importantly, between firms within industries. First, the average wage growth is closely tied to economy-wide aggregates, and wage increases, both negotiated and realized ones, exhibit less industrial variation than economic conditions do. Second, strikes at the firm level are illegal, which hinders workers' efforts to extract firm-specific rents arising from positive demand shocks or new innovations. Third, the obstacles to establishing new firms are low. Fourth, the degree of employment protection is not particularly strict nor slack by international standards, being less strict than in most European countries. Below, we give a brief description of these institutional features.
Centralized wage setting
The Finnish labour market is characterised by a corporatist structure, where comprehensive unions and employers' associations bargain collectively over wages and working conditions in co-ordination with the government. Unions and employers' associations are formed along industrial lines, and they are further represented by their own central organisations. Within industries collective agreements are extended to also cover non-organised workers and employers, provided that the unionisation rate exceeds a certain threshold value. As a result, as much as some 95 per cent of all employer-employee relationships are regulated by collective agreements (Vartiainen, 1998) .
Although the binding collective agreements are signed between industrial unions and their employer counterparts, wage negotiations are often co-ordinated at national level. If the goals of individual unions appear to be similar enough, the central organisations of unions and employers' organisations can agree about a centralised framework that specifies a common wage increase with a narrow range for industry differentials. 1 In this case the centralised agreement will come into effect as the unions make out their industryspecific agreements accordingly. If the negotiation between the central organisations fails, 1 When bargaining takes place between the central organisations, the government is usually indirectly involved in these negotiations. The government may encourage the labour market parties to reach a moderate centralised agreement by making concessions about tax and policy issues, such as income taxes, unemployment benefits, active labour market policy and/or pension schemes. This can lead to a wide "income policy" agreement which implicitly covers a variety of labour market issues that are beyond the direct control of the labour market parties. In practice, co-ordination takes place in various informal forums, where the governmental officers meet the representatives of the employers' organisations and unions to discuss the topics of economic policy. One goal of such discussions is to search for a mutual understanding of the state of the economy, and hence of an "acceptable" range of wage increases for the next round of wage bargaining.
it is followed by an unco-ordinated round of bargaining, where each union enters into negotiations on its own terms. During the bargaining process the unions have an option to call a strike to intensify their wage claims, provided that the old agreement has expired.
Strikes take place at the industry level. It should be stressed that the employees of individual firms cannot take strike action when the collective agreement is in force.
In addition to the average wage growth, the unions are concerned with unemployment and distributional issues. Solidarity wage policy, which offers roughly equal wage growth to all groups with an intention of wage compression, has been a vital union goal and enjoys much support among citizens (though not among employers). While the solidarity nature of the centralised agreement is obvious, such a goal may be present in the rounds of unco-ordinated wage bargaining as well. There is evidence that unions' wage claims are not independent of each other. While unions in profitable industries may bargain over industry-specific agreements on their own terms, the wage claims of unions in the weaker industries are tied to wage claims in other industries. It follows that industrial discrepancies in economic conditions are not fully accounted for in the collective agreements, even during unco-ordinated rounds of bargaining. Moreover, wage increases followed by the unco-ordinated rounds are found to be higher on average (Koskela and Uusitalo, 2003) .
This supports the view that the high degree of centralisation in wage bargaining leads to wage moderation due to the internalisation of the cost of unemployment.
[ Table 1 about here ]
The degrees of centralization and co-ordination as well as the coverage of wage agreements are extremely high in Finland by international standards (see Table 1 ). These were common characteristics of the Nordic countries for a long time. In the late 1970s
Sweden and Denmark were ranked among the countries with the highest degree of centralisation and co-ordination in wage bargaining along with Finland (see OECD, 2006 
Employment protection
Employment protection legislation comprises rules to protect workers against individual dismissals, specific requirements for collective dismissals, and regulation of temporary employment contracts. In Finland the period of notice for individual dismissals increases with job tenure from one to six months, being the longest for employees with tenure of 15 years or more. There is no mandatory severance pay. Fixed-term contracts are allowed for temporary replacements, traineeship, and particular business conditions. In the case of collective dismissals the unions must be consulted. In the recent ranking of overall strictness of employment protection made by OECD (2006), Finland is ranked as number 14 among 28 countries (see Table 1 ). In particular, Finland is close to the OECD average, having less strict employment protection than most of the European countries.
The exceptions include Ireland, Switzerland, Hungary, Denmark, and the Czech Republic. So, Finland appears to have sound conditions for nourishing creative destruction process by entries. Indeed, empirical evidence by Maliranta (2003) gives support to such a view by making two findings from Finnish manufacturing industries. First, productivityenhancing intra-industry restructuring strongly contributed to productivity growth from the mid-1980s. Second, the major part of this process can be attributed to plants that were established in the latter part of the 1980s.
Conditions for business creation

Background
Some empirical observations
Divergent patterns of labour market outcomes between Europe and the United States over the past few decades have been the subject of much attention. The poor unemployment development in Europe has been associated with relatively stable wage inequality and a decline in the labour share, though the European averages hide a great deal of heterogeneity across countries. By contrast, the US (and the UK) has experienced an increase in wage inequality while the labour share has remained stable and unemployment at a low level.
[ Figure 1 about here ] Figure 1 shows the evolution of labour shares in the business sector since 1982 for selected OECD countries. It points to smooth declining paths, starting in the early or mid-1980s, for most economies in Continental Europe and sharp declines in the 1990s for the Nordic economies. These findings are in clear contrast to the US, the UK, and Japan, where the labour shares exhibit stable paths over the period. It is illustrative to contrast these long-term patterns of the labour shares with the estimates of average annual multifactor productivity growth rates shown in Figure 2 . In the 1990s productivity growth has been fastest in Ireland (4.41 per cent) and Finland (3.16 per cent), both of which experienced the sharpest drops in the labour share. 2 Other Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, and Denmark), which have labour market institutions quite similar to Finland, experienced declines in labour shares in the 1990s that were entailed with high multifactor productivity growth rates, too. By contrast, countries with stable labour shares seem to have experienced clearly less rapid technological progress, the US with 1.13 per cent, the UK with 0.74 per cent and Japan with 1.02 per cent growth rate of multifactor productivity in the 1990s. These observations give some support to the technologyrelated explanations of the factor income share changes. Rapid productivity growth among the Nordic countries, especially in the 1990s, is documented in several studies (see e.g. [ Figure 2 about here ] An additional piece of motivation comes from some findings made in the OECD's firm-level growth project that involved micro-level decompositions of productivity growth. 2 In Ireland the series of moderate tripartite wage agreements took place in the 1990s in an attempt to retain competitiveness and improve employment during a period of rapid growth in labour productivity (OECD, 2004, p. 156) . The government encouraged moderate wage claims by cutting taxes and improving social benefits. Interestingly, Finland has followed a similar policy over the same period (see discussion below).
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Those computations shed some further light on the differences in productivity growth rates across countries. According to the results reported in OECD (2003a), the restructuring components (between, entry and exit) together had no contribution whatsoever to labour productivity growth in US manufacturing in the years 1992-97. The respective number in the UK was 0.7 percentage points per year. On the other hand, productivity increases through reallocation of labour at the micro-level were substantially higher in Finland, the respective number being 2.2 percentage points per year in the years 1989-94.
A study by Maliranta and Rouvinen (2004) employing micro-data indicates that the use of ICT has had a significant effect on productivity in ICT producing and using manufacturing and service industries in Finland. What is particularly interesting for our analysis is that the study also finds evidence on the importance of micro-structural change by showing that the use of ICT has a stronger positive effect on productivity in younger firms.
Pilat (2004) provides a review of studies on the productivity effects of ICT.
The macro-economic environment in Finland
The beginning of the early 1980s was a time of steady economic growth but there was an overheating of the economy in the last years of the decade. The liberalization of the monetary markets in the mid-1980s was followed by an expansion in bank credits and a huge rise in asset prices. At the end of the 1980s the annual growth of the GNP was around 5 per cent and the unemployment rate within a range of 3 and 5 per cent. However, the falling export prices, rapid domestic inflation, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, with which Finland's foreign trade was notable at that time, led to speculative attacks against the Finnish markka, which was allowed to float in 1993 after a defensive battle. High interest rates and falling asset prices ran over-indebted firms into financial problems. This caused a wave of bankruptcies, and large-scale job destruction took place in virtually every sector of the economy. The GNP contracted three years in a row (1991) (1992) (1993) , and in the worst year of 1991 the GNP decreased by over 7 per cent.
The unemployment rate increased from 3 to close to 20 per cent between 1990 and 1994, even though masses of people were removed from unemployment and directed to active 9 labour market programmes.
The deep depression was followed by a strong recovery period. Exports turned on a path of strong growth already in 1992. The same occurred in the aggregate economy with a delay of two years, and the average growth rate of the GNP was around 5 per cent between 1994 and 2000. However, economic growth was built entirely on the export sector for a long time. Whereas the volume of exports doubled during the 1990s, recordhigh unemployment and households' debt problems, which the high interest rates and the collapse of asset prices had made worse, kept domestic demand below its pre-depression level up to 1999.
Not surprisingly, the economic crisis and mass unemployment were reflected in the collective wage agreements in the 1990s. Apart from the industry-specific wage agreements in 1994, the 1990s was a time of comprehensive centralized agreements, characterized by moderate wage increases. Economy-wide wage moderation was seen as a means of minimizing industrial disputes and protecting the competitiveness of the export sector.
These agreements were strongly supported by the government, which cut income taxes to compensate unions for wage moderation. Afterwards this strategy looks relatively successful: aggregate production and employment grew rapidly up to the end of the decade without inflationary pressures, although unemployment remained at a high level (which was partly due to increases in the labour supply). On the other hand, equal wage growth over a period of large industrial discrepancies in economic development led to distributional changes between labour and capital in some industries.
At the turn of the new millennium the Finnish economy had recovered from the depression in terms of many macro-economic indicators. The economic environment was, however, fundamentally changed from the times preceding the depression years. As part of the economic integration and deregulation within Europe and globally, Finnish firms had to respond to increasing international competition. A wave of mergers has taken place both within and across the border. The export-led recovery was associated with a rapid structural change towards high-tech industries. The increasing importance of ICT has been exceptionally sharp in Finland, which is, in large part, attributable to the rise of the mobile phone industry dominated by Nokia. For example, the volume of the exports of electrical equipment multiplied during the 1990s, which, in fact, explains a large fraction of the overall increase in exports.
Gross and net job creation increased very strongly in many Finnish sectors and industries, but in the manufacturing sector and the electronics industry in particular (Ilmakunnas and Maliranta, 2003) . Labour demand was particularly high among high productivity and profitable plants and firms, which led to productivity-enhancing micro-level restructuring within sectors and industries.
4 Decomposing the aggregate labour share
Basic concepts
The starting point of our study is the simple fact that aggregate labour share declines when aggregate labour productivity growth exceeds aggregate wage growth (measured in product prices). The great majority of studies in this literature assume explicitly or implicitly that these aggregate changes represent changes in a representative firm, and, as a consequence, the role of selection and restructuring at the level of plants or firms is totally ignored. The point of departure of our study is to abandon the representative firm framework and have a look at the different micro-level sources.
In the following we make our point more formally. Aggregate labour share F is
where W is the wage sum (also including supplements etc.) in product prices, V is real value added and L is labour input. Because the wage sum is expressed in product wages, this ratio indicates the nominal labour share.
The growth rate of the aggregate labour share is then the difference between the growth rates of aggregate wage and labour productivity:
The literature provides various methods to decompose continuous aggregate productivity change rates into different components by using discrete micro-level data. Typically, they include within (WH), between (or reallocation) (BW), entry (ENT) and exit (EXIT) components, so that See the extensive discussion in Maliranta (2003) and Diewert and Fox (2005) .
Obviously, the aggregate wage growth rate can be decomposed in an analogous way as
By substituting (3) and (4) into (2), we obtain the following decomposition for the growth in the aggregate labour share:
There is quite a wide consensus in Finland that the wage growth should be close to the national aggregate labour productivity growth. Aiming at that target, the agreements determine the minimum wage increases that each employer should give their (incumbent) employees. Essentially, these agreements thus set the minimum wage growth rate for each firm. In practice, a firm's wage growth rate might be sometimes smaller due to the turnover of workers, for instance.
Suppose that the economy is hit by a technological shock which enhances productivity growth via the increased entry of firms with more advanced technologies and reallocation among incumbent firms towards those able to adopt new technologies. During a rapid embodied technology change the national aggregate productivity growth rate may exceed the within firm productivity growth rate by a wide margin. When the common wage increases are determined by (an estimate of) aggregate productivity growth, we should expect in this case that
which means that the labour share increases (and profitability declines) within firms. As a consequence, a profound technological shock under a solidarity wage policy may further boost productivity enhancing-restructuring, i.e. positive entry, exit and between components of productivity growth. On the other hand, by curbing wage dispersion between firms, a wage policy based on solidarity, and aiming for wage compression, tends to keep these respective components of wage growth close to zero. 3 All in all, a solidarity wage policy combined with a profound technological change can be expected to be associated
In sum, a declining aggregate labour share may be a combination of quite different factors, and thereby it is worthwhile analysing the micro-level sources of the changes in labour shares.
Decomposition for the labour share
We denote the labour share of production unit (firm or plant) i in period t with f it = w it / v it , where w it is the wage sum and v it is value added, both of which are now measured in nominal terms. We wish to decompose the change in the aggregate labour share from period s to period t. Units appearing in periods s or t are classified into three groups:
those appearing in both s and t, i.e. continuing units indicated by C, those appearing in t but not in s, i.e. entrants indicated by E and those appearing in s but not in t,
i.e. disappearing units indicated by D. The change in the aggregate labour share can be decomposed as
where F t = i w it / i v it is the aggregate labour share in period t; s it = v it / j∈C v jt is the weight of unit i as measured by its share of aggregate value added among continuing units; F X t = i∈X w it / i∈X v it is the aggregate labour share among the group X ∈ {E, C, D} in period t; S X t = i∈X v it / i v it is the value added share of group X ∈ {E, D} ; and s i and f i are the average values of s and f over the periods t and s for unit i, respectively.
According to equation (6) 
Firm data for the business sector
The principal data source on firms is the Financial Statements Statistics (FSS), which is an annual survey conducted by Statistics Finland on the basis of corporate income statement and balance sheet data. The survey includes firms from manufacturing, construction, retail and wholesale trade, business services, accommodation and catering services, and transportation. Until 1996 (1995 in manufacturing and construction) the survey covered the entire population of firms above certain industry-specific size thresholds plus a stratified sample from the smaller firms. The stratified sample was rotated annually by replacing a fraction of the oldest companies in each stratum with new ones. The rotation sampling was applied to keep the survey representative in each point of time and to reduce the inquiry burden of smaller firms. In 1995/1996 the size thresholds were lowered but all firms below the new size thresholds were excluded from the survey. As a result, coverage with respect to medium-size firms improved but all the data on small firms was lost.
In the first stage we combined the annual FSS surveys from 1989-1998. These data were complemented by adding records on small firms for the period 1994-1998 from the Business Tax Register. Whereas the information content is more limited, the Business Tax Register basically covers all firms. As a result, we have panel data for the selected industries, which cover the universe of the firms from 1994 to 1998 and a representative sample from 1989 to 1993. In the subsequent analysis we exclude all firms with less than five employees, as the data on very small firms is often noisy. This group of firms is not important in terms of employment or production.
Observations in the firm data refer to the accounting periods, which may deviate from the calendar years for some firms. A particular problem in the data is that firm identifiers may change for several reasons, such as in cases of a merger or of a change in ownership or industry classification. We have been able to correct such spurious changes in the firm identifiers to some extent. This is so because the firm records can be matched to the records of all employees of each firm (see Korkeamäki and Kyyrä, 2000 , for details of the data). By following the worker flows between firms one can infer whether the entry and exit of firm identifiers in the data result from firm closures, births, takeovers, mergers, or some administrative reasons.
Results
We begin with an analysis of the plant data from the manufacturing sector. We have calculated the micro-components of changes in the aggregate labour share within 2-digit manufacturing industries using the decomposition formula (6). To give an overview of dynamics in the manufacturing sector, we show the cumulative effects for the period Figure 3 , as obtained by aggregating industry-specific effects to the total manufacturing level. The aggregation over industries was performed using nominal value added as weights. This serves to eliminate the effect of structural shifts between industries.
1975-2001 in
In the graphs we focus on the cumulative effects, as they are less noisy than the values of individual components, which vary from year to year to a large extent. In addition, the averages of annual within and between components for the periods 1975-1990 and 1990-2001 by 2-digit industries are reported in Table 2 .
[ Figure 3 about here ]
The bold line in Figure 3 points to a declining trend for the aggregate labour share, starting from the early 1980s. The other lines in the graph describe the relative importance of the underlying micro-level forces that are responsible for the aggregate development.
The cumulative effect of the within component appears to be positive over the long run.
From Table 2 we see that the within component is also typically positive within detailed industries. Thus at the plant level labour shares are typically growing, not declining as was the case at the aggregate level in the 1980s and 1990s. Discrepancy between developments at the micro and macro level is due to restructuring, i.e. the entry, exit and between components.
The between component is of particular interest because it captures the contribution of the reallocation of resources between continuing plants, which comprise some 80-85 per cent of the total annual labour reallocation in Finland. It is the most robust and reliable indicator of restructuring, especially at the detailed industry level. In many industries the between component is consistently negative from year to year. Consequently, the cumulative contribution of the between component is often very strong, despite its minor role in explaining the annual changes in the industry labour share. The numbers given in Table 2 show that restructuring tends to decrease the aggregate labour share in industries, the only exceptions being electrical machinery and coke and petroleum in the period 1975-90 and food, beverages and tobacco in the later period. We see particularly strong negative effects in the manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and in the manufacture of office machinery and computers in the 1990s.
[ Table 2 about here ]
Not surprisingly, the between component in Figure 3 is strongly negative over the recession years, indicating that plants with low labour shares were raising their market shares as measured by nominal value added. This makes sense, as a low labour share points to a good financial position or to capital-intensive production technology, and among such plants the need to cut employment and production was probably lower than among other plants.
The entry and exit components, to the extent that they capture the impact of plant births and deaths, are closely related to the between component in describing the reallocation of resources in the market. The exit component is typically negative, indicating higher-than-average labour shares for plants exiting the market. Its cumulative effect is important but still smaller than that of the between component. Griliches and Regev (1995) provide evidence of the "shadow of death" tendency. It is common that the productivity level (labour share) of the exiting plant is below (above) the average level many years before the actual exit. Such a dying firm is likely to also have lower than average labour demand and thus its relative size decreases over the last years. So, an exiting plant or firm has usually contributed negatively to the between component during its "countdown" that may last several years. All in all, arguably the between and exit component largely gauge the same underlying renewal process.
The entry component has had a relatively neutral effect on the factor income shares over the observation period. On the other hand, the entry process, like exit process, is a time-consuming process. The initial productivity level of the new firms and plants is usually less and the labour income share more than that of incumbent ones. The group of young firms and plants is, however, particularly heterogeneous and subject to intensive selection in the subsequent years. This after-birth selection is likely to have a tendency to decrease the labour income share, and this should be reflected in the negative between component. Perfectly consistently with these considerations, Maliranta (2003) has showed that a disproportionately large part of the productivity-enhancing restructuring can be attributed to the relatively young plants.
When the economy was hit by the recession in the early 1990s, the labour shares within plants increased, which was followed by a period of falling labour shares. That is, the spike in the aggregate labour share in the early 1990s can be attributed almost entirely to the within component (see Figure 3 ). This dynamics can be explained by a delay between drops in production and employment. In the first stage, production fell rapidly, pushing the labour shares up. With a delay of about one year the plants reacted to this demand shock by laying off masses of workers. This, in turn, cut the wage sums and hence the labour shares in the second stage. As a result, the recovery that started in 1992-93 in manufacturing entailed about equally large cyclical rebound within plants.
Next we explore the importance of the changing industrial structure in explaining the aggregate development in manufacturing. Recall that this effect was controlled for in Figure 3 . Table 2 [ Figure 5 about here ]
Next we turn to the decomposition results obtained from the firm data. 
Conclusion
We found evidence that the decline in the aggregate labour share in the 1990s stems in large part from the reallocation of resources between firms and plants. In manufacturing, this reallocation process has taken place mainly within the industries, i.e. changes in industry structures play only a limited role in explaining the aggregate development.
Within manufacturing industries much of the decline in the labour share is attributable to the between and exit components, which are negative from year to year. The cumulative effect of the within component, especially in the case of the plant data, has only a small contribution to the aggregate decline in the labour share in the 1990s.
In other words, the distribution of capital and labour income has been much more stable at the firm and plant level than at the industry level. This striking finding, which is beyond the aggregate level analysis, has two essential implications. First, attempts to hike the aggregate labour share up again via equal and high wage increases at the industry/economy level are likely to result in strong negative employment effects. This is because such a wage policy would evidently lead to a distributional change in favour of labour within firms, where employment decisions are made. Secondly, as a lesson for those 22 who are building theoretical models, our results highlight the importance of heterogeneity across firms/plants and turnover of labour and capital inputs in explaining movements in the aggregate labour share. Insights derived from macro-models of the representative firm should therefore be interpreted with great caution. S w e d e n G e r m a n F r a n c e U n i t e d K i n g d o m S p a in I t a l y A u s t r i a B e l g i u m I r e l a n d N e t h e r l a n d s G r e e c e U n i t e d S t a t e s J a p a n 
